Formal Design of Dynamic Reconfiguration Protocol for Cloud Applications by Abid, Rim et al.
Formal Design of Dynamic Reconfiguration Protocol for
Cloud Applications
Rim Abid, Gwen Salau¨n, Noel De Palma
To cite this version:
Rim Abid, Gwen Salau¨n, Noel De Palma. Formal Design of Dynamic Reconfiguration Proto-
col for Cloud Applications. Science of Computer Programming, Elsevier, 2016, 117, pp.1-16.
<10.1016/j.scico.2015.12.001>. <hal-01246152>
HAL Id: hal-01246152
https://hal.inria.fr/hal-01246152
Submitted on 18 Dec 2015
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
Formal Design of Dynamic Reconfiguration Protocol for
Cloud Applications
Rim Abid, Gwen Salau¨n, Noel De Palma
University of Grenoble Alpes, France
Abstract
Cloud applications are complex applications composed of a set of intercon-
nected software components running on different virtual machines, hosted on
remote physical servers. Deploying and reconfiguring this kind of applications
are very complicated tasks especially when one or multiple virtual machines
fail when achieving these tasks. Hence, there is a need for protocols that can
dynamically reconfigure and manage running distributed applications. In
this article, we present a novel protocol, which aims at reconfiguring cloud
applications. This protocol is able to ensure communication between virtual
machines and resolve dependencies by exchanging messages, (dis)connecting,
and starting/stopping components in a specific order. The interaction be-
tween machines is assured via a publish-subscribe messaging system. Each
machine reconfigures itself in a decentralized way. The protocol supports vir-
tual machine failures, and the reconfiguration always terminates successfully
even in the presence of a finite number of failures. Due to the high degree
of parallelism inherent to these applications, the protocol was specified using
the LNT value-passing process algebra and verified using the model checking
tools available in the CADP toolbox. The use of formal specification lan-
guages and tools helped to detect several bugs and to improve the protocol.
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1. Introduction
Cloud computing leverages hosting platforms based on virtualization and
provides resources and software applications as service over the network (such
as the Internet). It allows users to benefit from these services without requir-
ing expertise in each of them. For service providers, this gives the opportunity
to develop, deploy, and sell cloud applications worldwide without having to
invest upfront in expensive IT infrastructure.
Cloud applications are intricate distributed applications composed of a
set of virtual machines (VMs) running a set of interconnected software com-
ponents. Cloud users need to (re)configure and monitor applications during
their time life for elasticity or maintenance purposes. Therefore, after de-
ployment of these applications, some reconfiguration operations are required
for setting up new virtual machines, replicating some of them, destroying
or adding virtual machines, handling VM failures, and adding or removing
components hosted on a VM. Some of these tasks are executed in parallel,
which complicates their correct execution.
Existing protocols [15, 17, 31] focus mainly on self-deployment issues
where the model of application (the number of virtual machines, compo-
nents, ports, and connections between components) is known before the ap-
plication execution. These approaches manage static applications which do
not require to be changed after the deployment phase. Existing deployment
solutions barely take into account configuration parameters. Unlike these
static applications, cloud applications need to be reconfigured in order to
include new requirements, to fulfill the users expectations, or to perform
failure recovery. More specifically, cloud users need protocols that are not
only limited to deploy specific applications, but that are also able to modify
applications during their execution and take into account the changes that
can occur such as the failure of some virtual machine.
In this article, we introduce a novel protocol which aims at automatically
deploying and (re)configuring applications in the cloud. These applications
are composed of multiple and interconnected software components hosted
on separate virtual machines. A reconfiguration manager guides the recon-
figuration tasks by instantiating new VMs or destroying/repairing existing
VMs. The reconfiguration manager may also apply a number of architectural
changes to the application by adding new components or removing existing
components hosted on a specific VM. After the creation of a component due
to the instantiation of a VM or to a component addition request, the proto-
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col is responsible for starting all components in the correct order according
to the architectural dependencies. Each VM embeds a local reconfiguration
agent that interacts with the other remote agents. For each component,
the VM agent tries to satisfy its required services by connecting them to
their providers in order to start the component. The component cannot be
started before the components it depends on. The provider of the service can
be hosted on the same VM or on another VM. When a VM receives a VM de-
struction or a component removal request from the reconfiguration manager,
it tries to stop and unbind each component. A component cannot stop before
all partner components connected to it have unbound themselves. In order to
exchange messages and bind/start/unbind/stop components, VMs commu-
nicate together through a publish-subscribe messaging system. The protocol
is also able to detect VM failures that occur to a running application. When
a VM failure occurs, the protocol notifies the VMs that are impacted. The
protocol supports multiple failures. It always succeeds in finally reconfiguring
the application at hand and stopping/starting all components.
Our management protocol implies a high degree of parallelism. Hence,
we decided to use formal techniques and tools to specify, verify the proto-
col, and ensure that it preserves important architectural invariants (e.g., a
started component cannot be connected to a stopped component) and satisfies
certain properties (e.g., each VM failure is followed by a new creation of that
VM). The protocol was specified using the specification language LOTOS
NT (LNT for short) [12], which is an improved version of LOTOS [20], and
verified with the CADP verification toolbox [18]. For verification purposes,
we used 600 hand-crafted examples (application models and reconfiguration
scenarios). For each example, we generated the Labelled Transition System
(LTS) from the LNT specification and we checked on them about 40 prop-
erties that must be respected by the protocol during its application. To do
so, we used the model checking tools available in the CADP toolbox. These
formal techniques and tools helped us improve the protocol by (i) detecting
several issues and bugs, and by (ii) correcting them systematically in the
corresponding Java implementation.
Our main contributions with respect to related approaches are the fol-
lowing:
• We propose a novel protocol, which reconfigures cloud applications con-
sisting of a set of interconnected software components distributed over
remote virtual machines.
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• The protocol is fault-tolerant in the sense that it is able to detect and
repair VM failures.
• The protocol was verified using model checking techniques and is im-
plemented in Java.
The outline of this article is as follows. Section 2 introduces the recon-
figuration protocol and presents how it works on some concrete applications.
We present in Section 3 the LNT specification of the protocol and its verifi-
cation using CADP. Section 4 reviews related work and Section 5 concludes
the article.
2. Reconfiguration Protocol
This section successively presents the application model, the protocol par-
ticipants, the protocol itself including the different possible reconfiguration
operations, and an overview of the Java implementation.
2.1. Application Model
In this section, we present an abstraction of the model, which is sufficient
for explaining the protocol principles. The real model exhibits more details
such as port numbers, URLs, and other implementation details. The model
we use here is used for verifying the soundness of the protocol but its primary
role is to keep track of the VMs and components currently deployed in a cloud
application.
An application is composed of a set of interconnected software components
hosted on different virtual machines (VMs). Each component may provide
services via exports and require services via imports. Ports are typed and
match when they share the same type. One export can provide its service to
several components and can thus be connected to several imports. An import
must be connected to one export only provided by a component hosted on
the same machine (local binding) or a component hosted on another machine
(remote binding). When many exports provide the same service, the import
is bound to one of them which is randomly chosen by the publish-subscribe
system. The import can be mandatory or optional. A mandatory import
represents a service required by the component to be functional. Therefore,
if the component needs mandatory imports, it cannot be started before all
its imports are satisfied (i.e., all mandatory imports are connected to started
components). On the other side, an optional import is a service needed by
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the component but not necessary for starting it. When a component has
an optional service, it can be started before the component that provides it,
which makes our model supports circular dependencies that involve at least
one optional import. Hence, the connection of an optional import may be
achieved after the start-up of the service requester and provider. Both kinds
of ports are usual in component-based applications. Our protocol does not
distinguish port types during the port resolution and (un)binding phases,
but does when starting / stopping components.
A component used in this model has three states, namely, stopped, started,
and failed. Initially, when the VM is instantiated, all its hosted components
are stopped. For each component, once all its mandatory imports (if any
mandatory import exists) are bound to started components, the component
can be started. Reversely the component must stop when at least one of the
components to which it is connected through mandatory import requires to
stop. When the VM fails, all its components are failed.
This model is classic for designing autonomous protocols and has been used
for describing, deploying, and reconfiguring real-world applications (see e.g.,
[21, 9, 28, 15, 17, 31]). It is expressive enough for reconfiguration purposes,
but should be enhanced for other tasks. For instance, if one’s interest is
quality of service, we would need more information in the model.
Figure 1: Example of an application model
Figure 1 gives an example of an application model, which consists of three
VMs. The first one (VM1) hosts two components Apache1 and Apache2.
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Apache1 has a mandatory import that is Workers1. Therefore, Apache1
cannot be started before the start-up of the Workers1 provider. Apache2 has
an optional import that is Workers2. Thus, it can be started before the start-
up of Workers2 provider. Both VM2 and VM3 are hosting one component
(Tomcat and MySQL respectively). Tomcat provides two services that are
Workers1 and Workers2 and has a mandatory import that is Data. Therefore,
Tomcat cannot be started before the Data provider. MySQL does not require
any service. Therefore, it can be started immediately.
2.2. Protocol Participants
The management protocol includes three participants as showed in Fig-
ure 2. The reconfiguration manager (RM) guides the application reconfigu-
ration by posting reconfiguration operations (e.g., instantiating/destroying
VMs, adding/removing components) that are described in a reconfiguration
scenario. The RM is also in charge of repairing a VM failure by creating a new
instance of the failed VM. Each VM is equipped with a reconfiguration agent
(agent for short in the rest of this article) that is in charge of (dis)connecting
bindings and starting/stopping components upon reception of VM instanti-
ation/destruction and adding/removing reconfiguration operations from the
RM. The publish-subscribe messaging system (PS) supports the exchange
of communications among all VMs. The PS transfers messages from a ma-
chine to others machines. To do so, it contains a list of buffers (a buffer for
each VM). Each buffer is used to store the messages exchanged between the
agent of its VM and the other agents. When a new VM is instantiated, a
buffer for that VM is added to the PS. When an existing VM is destroyed,
its buffer is removed from the PS. We assume that the communication model
is reliable and messages are never lost during the communication between all
participants. The PS also contains two topics: 1 (i) the export topic where
a component publishes its exports and subscribes its imports, and (ii) an
import topic where a component publishes its imports and subscribes its
exports.
1A topic is a logical channel where messages are published and subscribers to a topic
receive messages published on that topic.
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Figure 2: Protocol participants
2.3. Protocol Description
The protocol allows to instantiate new VMs/destroy existing VMs, to
add a new component to an existing VM or to remove a component from
its hosting VM. The protocol also supports VM failures. We explain in this
section how the protocol works in these different situations.
2.3.1. Start-up
The RM guides the application reconfiguration by instantiating new VMs
and also adding components to an existing VM. In both cases, the goal of
the VM agent is to start components.
We explain first how the protocol works in order to add a component to a
running application and start it. We present in Figure 3 the agent behavior
when the component has mandatory imports only. First the agent receives
an add component request (Ê) from the RM. When the component provides
services, for each service, it subscribes to the import topic and then publishes
the service to the export topic (Ë). Then, if the component does not have any
import, it starts immediately. Otherwise, each mandatory import requires
an export with the same type provided by another component hosted on the
same VM or on another VM. To be functional, the component expects that all
its mandatory imports will be connected to started components. Therefore,
for each mandatory import, the component subscribes to the export topic
and then publishes the import to the import topic (Ì). The PS receives that
message and checks the import topic. If it does not find a provider for the
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service, the publication message is deleted. If it finds more than one service
provider, the PS picks one randomly and sends a message with binding details
and component state. Upon reception of that message (Í), the import binds
to this compatible export (Î). Then, the VM agent sends a binding message
(Ï) to the PS. When all the mandatory imports are connected and all the
partner components have been started, the VM agent starts the component
(Ð) and sends a started message to the PS (Ñ).
When the component has also optional imports, it can start even if these
imports are not satisfied. For each optional import, it subscribes to the
export topic and publishes the import to the import topic. Upon reception
of a message with binding details and component state, the import binds to
this compatible export only if the component state is started.
Figure 3: The Agent behavior when adding a new component with mandatory imports
only
Second, we present how the protocol works to add a new VM to a running
application. Once the RM instantiates a new VM, a buffer for this VM is
added to the list of the PS buffers. After the creation of the new VM, its
agent is in charge of starting all the components hosted on this VM. For this,
it considers each component hosted on the new VM like a new component
that will be added to an existing VM (see explanations above).
2.3.2. Shutdown
The second goal of the protocol is to remove existing components from a
VM or to destroy an existing VM from a running application.
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We present first how the protocol works when the RM requires the re-
moval of a component from a VM as depicted in Figure 4. When the agent
receives the remove component request from the RM (Ê), it tries to stop
the component without violating any architectural invariants (e.g., a started
component cannot be connected to a stopped component). To do so, if the
component does not provide any export, it stops immediately (Î). Then it
unbinds (Ï) all its connections and sends an “unbind confirmed” message for
each import (Ð). When the component provides services, before stopping it,
all components bound to it through mandatory imports must stop and then
unbind in order to restore consistency of the whole application. Components
bound to it through optional imports, need only to unbind without stop-
ping. Therefore, for each export, it unsubscribes from the import topic (Ë)
and then sends “an ask to unbind” message (Ì) to the PS. Then , it waits
until all components bound to it through mandatory imports stop and then
disconnect. Components bound to it through optional imports need only to
disconnect. When the PS receives an “ask to unbind” message, it transmits
it to all components subscribed to that export. It notifies the component
that need to stop when another component connected to it has unbound by
sending an “unbind confirmed” message (Í). Once all components connected
to it have effectively unbound, it can stop itself (Î), unbind all its imports
(Ï), and send an “unbind confirmed” message to the PS (Ð).
Figure 4: The agent behavior when removing a component
When a component receives an “ask to unbind” message (Figure 5), it
can remain in the same state and unbinds directly if it is bound through
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an optional import. If it is bound through a mandatory import, the pro-
tocol handles it as done for the component that needs to be removed. The
only differences between stopping a component that will be removed and a
component that receives an “ask to unbind” message are that, the second
one should not unsubscribe from the import topic if it provides exports and
after unbinding, it publishes its import in order to connect to another export
proposed by the publish-subscribe system (Ð).
Figure 5: The agent behavior when stopping a component
The component shutdown implies a backward propagation of “ask to un-
bind” messages and, when this first propagation ends (on components with
no export or optional imports only), a second forward propagation of “unbind
confirmed” messages starts to let the components know that the disconnec-
tion has been actually achieved.
When the RM sends a destruction VM request, the VM agent must prop-
erly stop all the components hosted on that VM as well as all components
bound to them. Therefore, for each component hosted on the VM that will be
destroyed, it behaves as if it has received a remove component request. Once
all components are removed, the VM is finally destroyed (see explanations
above).
2.3.3. VM Failures
VM failures and component failures can occur at any time to a running
application (e.g., during a reconfiguration). We present in this section only
the VM failure. A component failure is a specific case of a VM failure, so
this is not a fundamental addition to the current protocol. When a VM fails,
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all its hosted components stop unexpectedly without alerting any partner
components. Therefore, we can be in a situation where started components
are connected to failed components. In order to restore the application con-
sistency (i.e., architectural invariants), VM failures must be handled imme-
diately. We explain in this section how the protocol takes into account VM
failures and how it works to manage them (Fig. 6). The protocol supports
also the case of multiple failures.
When a VM is instantiated, its agent interacts with the RM by peri-
odically sending an “alive” message. The RM is configured to receive this
message periodically from each agent. As long as the RM receives these
“alive” messages from each agent within a specific delay, it considers that
its VM is working correctly and still alive [6] (Ê). Once the RM does not
receive one of these “alive” messages from an agent before the delay elapses,
it assumes that its VM has failed (Ë). In that case, it alerts the PS (Ì) and
then starts the repair phase by creating a new instance of the failed VM (Í).
The new VM behaves as if the machine is instantiated for the first time (see
Section 2.3.1).
Figure 6: The RM behavior when detecting a VM failure
When the PS receives an “alert failure” message from the RM (Î), it
unsubscribes each failed component exporting services from the import topic
to avoid that other components try to connect to it (Ï). Then, it warns the
other VMs of this failure by:
• sending messages notifying all components bound to the failed com-
ponents about the VM failure and asking them to unbind (Ð). When
11
an agent receives this kind of message, it tries to stop the impacted
component if it is bound through a mandatory import or remains in
the same state if it is bound through optional import. Then it unbinds
it and tries to connect the disconnected import in order to restart the
component as presented in Section 2.3.2;
• sending an “unbind confirmed” message to each component to which
a failed component was connected via mandatory or optional import
(Ñ). The reception of this message by a component that needs to stop
indicates the disconnection has been actually achieved.
Figure 7: The PS behavior when receiving an alert failure message
In the case of a component failure, the agent of the VM on which it is
hosted informs the PS and then creates a new instance of the failed compo-
nent. The new component behaves as a component added to the application
for the first time. When the PS receives the component failure alert, it reacts
in the same way as for each component hosted on a failed VM.
2.4. Examples
We present in this section an example of removal and addition of a com-
ponent to the application showed in Figure 1, as well as an example of VM
failure. In this example, we begin with a running application where all com-
ponents are connected and started.
12
2.4.1. A scenario of component removal
As it is depicted in Figure 8, the RM requests the VM2 agent to remove
Tomcat (RM.1). Once VM2 receives the request, it aims to stop the Tom-
cat component before removing it. To do so, all components connected to
the Tomcat must be stopped before. Tomcat provides two services Work-
ers1 and Workers2. Thus, for each export, it unsubscribes from the import
topic (A2.1 and A2.3) and sends messages to the PS asking it to unbind
all components connected to it through Workers1 and Workers2 (A2.2 and
A2.4). The PS receives these messages, checks the export topic and finds that
Apache1 (Apache2 respectively) hosted on VM1 imports Workers1 (Workers2
respectively) from Tomcat. Therefore, it sends “ask to unbind” messages to
Apache1 and Apache2 (PS.1 and PS.2). When VM1 receives these messages,
Apache1 does not provide any service and it is bound to the Tomcat com-
ponent through a mandatory import, so it is immediately stopped (A1.1).
Then, it is unbound from Tomcat, sends an “unbind confirmed” message to
the PS (A1.2), and publishes its import to the import topic (A1.3). VM2
receives that message from the PS (PS.3) but cannot stop the Tomcat com-
ponent because Apache2 is still connected to it. Apache2 is connected to the
Tomcat component through an optional import. Thus, it is only unbound
from Tomcat without stopping, then sends an “unbind confirmed” message to
the PS (A1.4), and publishes its import to the import topic (A1.5). The PS
checks the import topic but there is no component that provides Workers1 or
Workers2. VM2 receives the “unbind confirmed” message from the PS (PS.4).
Tomcat has no component bound to it any more, so it is stopped (A2.5).
Tomcat is unbound from MySQL and the VM2 agent sends an “unbind con-
firmed” message to the PS (A2.6). The PS finally sends that message to the
MySQL component (PS.5).
2.4.2. A scenario of component addition
We present in this section an example of component addition to an ex-
isting VM. We show how to add a new instance of Tomcat to VM2 after
removing it in Section 2.4.1.
VM2 receives the Tomcat addition request from the RM (1). The Tomcat
component requires a mandatory service whose type is Data. Therefore, it
subscribes to the export topic and then publishes its import to the import
topic (A2.1). Tomcat provides two services Workers1 and Workers2. There-
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Figure 8: The participants behavior when removing the Tomcat component
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fore, for each export it subscribes to the import topic and then publishes it
to the export topic (A2.2 and A2.3). The PS receives the first message from
the VM2 agent, checks the import topic and finds that only MySQL provides
a Data service (it has subscribed to the import topic). The PS notifies VM3
that there is a Tomcat that needs Data (PS.1). When Tomcat publishes its
exports, the PS forwards the binding details and Tomcat state to Apache1 be-
cause it has subscribed to the export topic for Workers1 (PS.2) (Apache2 re-
spectively because it has subscribed to the export topic for Workers2 (PS.3)).
When VM1 receives the binding details and Tomcat state, Apache1 connects
to Tomcat (A1.1) but it cannot start because the Tomcat state is stopped.
Apache2 cannot connect to Tomcat because it is started and Tomcat is still
stopped. After receiving the notification message from the PS about the
Tomcat component need (PS.1), VM3 sends the MySQL binding details and
state that it is started (A3.1). The PS receives the start-up information from
the VM3 agent, checks and finds that the Tomcat component has required
this service (it has subscribed to the export topic). Hence, a message with
binding details and MySQL’s state is added to VM2 buffer (PS.4). Upon
reception of this message, the Tomcat component is bound to the mySQL
component (A2.4) and the VM2 agent starts the Tomcat component (A2.5).
Then, the Tomcat component publishes a started message containing its new
state (A2.6). The PS receives that message and forwards it to VM1 (PS.5).
Upon reception of this message, the VM1 agent starts the Apache1 compo-
nent (A1.2). Apache2 can finally connect to the Tomcat component (A1.3).
2.4.3. A scenario of VM Failure repair
We present in this section an example of failure/repair of VM2. When
VM2 fails, Tomcat is suddenly stopped without alerting the components
bound to it. Therefore, Apache1 and Apache2 that are started are bound to
a stopped component. When the RM detects the failure of VM2 (RM.1), it
immediately alerts the PS (RM.2). Then, the RM creates a new instance of
VM2 (RM.3).
When the PS receives the alert message from the RM announcing the VM2
failure, it unsubscribes Tomcat from the import topic (PS.1). Then, it checks
the export topic in order to find the impacted components. Thus, it finds
that Apache1 and Apache2 are connected to Tomcat. Therefore, it notifies
them about the failure (PS.2 and PS.3). When VM1 receives the notification
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Figure 9: The participants behavior when adding the Tomcat component
messages, Apache1 does not provide any service and it is connect to Tomcat
through a mandatory import so it is immediately stopped (A1.1). It is also
unbound from the Tomcat component, sends an “unbind confirmed” message
to the PS (A1.2), and then publishes its import to the import topic (A1.3).
Apache2 does not provide any service and is connected to the failed com-
ponent through an optional import so it is unbound from Tomcat without
stopping, sends an “unbind confirmed” message to the PS (A1.4), and then
publishes its import to the import topic (A1.5).
After the creation of a new instance of VM2, each agent starts the compo-
nents impacted by the failure as presented in Section 2.3.1.
2.5. Implementation
We present in this section some implementation details concerning the
protocol. The core of the system of our implementation is roughly 6K lines
of Java code. It is based on a IaaS abstraction layer that allows to instantiate
16
Figure 10: The participants behavior when detecting the VM2 failure
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VMs on different IaaSs (such as Amazon EC2 and Microsoft Azure) and on
RabbitMQ [3], which is an implementation of the AMQP standard [1]. It is
a message server, implementing the publish-subscribe messaging system. It
is mainly used for the communication between VMs and RM. We chose an
AMQP communication system in order to have a reliable and asynchronous
communication system.
When the user requests the deployment of a new software instance, the
RM first checks about the VM instance defined in the software instance
model. If the user asks to deploy the software application on an already
existing VM instance, the RM immediately sends the model to the VM.
Otherwise, the RM checks if the software type of the software instance has a
VM type defined. If so, the RM asks the IaaS to instantiate one VM of this
kind. Otherwise, the RM asks the IaaS to instantiate a VM from the default
VM template. When the RM asks the IaaS to instantiate a VM, it creates a
message buffer on the message server for that VM.
When the RM sends the software instance model to the VM instance, it
serializes the software instance object and sends it to the message buffer of
the VM along with the configuration files (Puppet recipes for example). This
part can be done even when the VM is not running thanks to the messages
stored in its message buffer. When the VM boots, the agent starts, connects
to the message buffer and gets the message.
The agent on the VM gets the software instance model and the config-
uration files associated with it. It checks what connector it has to use to
perform the operations for the software instance. A connector is a Java class
that implements four simple operations: setup, update, start, and stop. A
connector is independent from any software it will install, it only does basic
operations. The operations related to the software are located in the con-
figuration files. Each connector, when calling a basic operation, transmits
the configuration of the model (such as variables and imported variables) to
the packaging and configuration system. This mechanism enables the user to
separate actual operations on VM from binding details. Multiple connectors
enable users to keep the original way of installing and configuring the soft-
ware. In addition, it also enables to cover almost any kind of software: from
software available in Linux repositories to legacy software. We implemented
a Puppet [2] connector in order to install and update software on VMs. Pup-
pet is one of the most known configuration system. It provides a language
and a program. The language enables to describe the state of a system by
describing its packages, files and services.
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When the installation is completed (software instances are installed on
VMs), each agent publish its configuration (according to the exports) and
subscribe to other remote configuration (according to the imports) by using
the RabbitMQ API.
3. Specification and Verification
In this section, we present the specification of the protocol in LNT [12],
an input language of CADP [18]. LNT is an improved and simplified ver-
sion of LOTOS [20]. This language is expressive enough for specifying the
reconfiguration protocol, in particular it supports the description of com-
plex data types and concurrent processes. Its user-friendly notation simpli-
fies the specification writing. LNT processes are built from actions, choices
(select), parallel composition (par), looping behaviors (loop), conditions
(if), and sequential composition (;). The communication between the proto-
col participants is carried out by rendezvous on a list of synchronized actions
included in the parallel composition (par). The specification is analyzed
using CADP [18]. CADP is a verification toolbox dedicated to the design,
analysis, and verification of asynchronous systems consisting of concurrent
processes interacting via message passing. The toolbox contains many tools
that can be used to make different analysis such as simulation, model check-
ing, equivalence checking, compositional verification, test case generation,
or performance evaluation. Therefore, we rely on the state-of-the-art veri-
fication tools provided by CADP to check that the protocol respects some
important properties.
In the rest of this section, we present the specification of the protocol
in LNT, its verification using the CADP model checker (Evaluator), some
experimental results, and problems detected and corrected during the verifi-
cation process. It is worth noting that since these techniques and tools work
on finite state spaces only, although dynamic reconfiguration may apply in-
finitely, we use only finite models and scenarios for verification purposes in
this section.
3.1. Specification
The number of lines of processes depends on the size of the application
model (the number of VM, component and ports). Processes are generated
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for each input application model2, because a part of the LNT code depends
on the number of VMs and on their identifiers. Therefore, the number of lines
for processes grows with the number of VMs in the application model. The
specification of the protocol consists of three parts: data types (200 lines),
functions (800 lines), and processes (1,500 lines). The number given above
corresponds to an example with three VMs.
3.1.1. Data types
They are used to describe the distributed application model (VMs, com-
ponents, ports), the communication model (binding between components,
messages, buffers, and topics), and the component states. We show below a
few examples of data types. The application model (TModel) consists of a
set of virtual machines (TVM). Each VM has an identifier (TID) and a set of
components (TSoftware).
type TModel is set of TVM end type
type TVM is tvm (idvm: TID, cs: TSoftware) end type
type TSoftware is set of TComponent end type
3.1.2. Functions
They apply on data expressions. Functions are used to define all the
computations necessary for reconfiguration purposes (e.g., extracting infor-
mation from the application, describing buffers and basic operations on them
like adding/retrieving messages, changing the state of a component, keeping
track of the started/unbound components, verifying the satisfaction of the
imports, etc.). Let us show, for illustration purposes, an example of function
that aims at removing a message from a buffer by using the FIFO strat-
egy. This strategy consists in removing the message from the beginning and
adding a new message at the end of the buffer. The remove function takes
as input a buffer (q) which type is (TBuffer) that is composed of an identi-
fier (TID) and a list of messages (TMessage). If the buffer is empty, nothing
happens. When the buffer is not empty, the first message is removed.
function remove_MSG (q: TBUFFER): TBUFFER is
case q in
2We developed an LNT code generator in Python for automating this task.
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var name: TID, hd: TMessage, tl: TQueue in
| tbuffer(name,nil) -> return q
| tbuffer(name,cons(hd,tl)) -> return tbuffer(name,tl)
end case
end function
3.1.3. Processes
They are used to specify the participants of the protocol (the reconfig-
uration manager, the publish-subscribe messaging server, and an agent per
VM). The reconfiguration manager guides the application reconfiguration.
Each agent drives the behavior of its VM and encodes most of the proto-
col functionality in order to start/stop all the components hosted on its VM.
The publish-subscribe messaging system assures the communication between
all VMs. Its is equipped by a set of FIFO buffers (a buffer for each VM in
the application). Each participant is specified as an LNT process and in-
volves two sort of actions: actions which correspond to interactions with
the other participants such as PStoAGENT that presents the message trans-
ferred from the publish-subscribe messaging system processes to the agent
processes, AGENTtoPS that presents the message transferred from the agent
processes to the publish-subscribe messaging system. The second type of
action taggs specific moments of the protocol execution such as the VM in-
stantiation/destruction, the component start-up/shutdown, the component
addition/removal, the effective binding/unbinding of an import to an export,
the failure of a VM, etc.
For illustration purposes, we present the LNT process main (named MAIN)
generated for an example of application model involving three VMs. The
LNT parallel composition is described with par followed by a set of synchro-
nization actions that must synchronize together. Two processes synchronize
if they share the same action. We can see that the agents do not inter-
act directly together and evolve independently from one another. The VM
agents communicate together through the PS. Each agent is identified using
the VM name and synchronizes with the PS on AGENTtoPSi action when
sending a message to the PS and PStoAGENTi action (i = 1, 2, 3) when
receiving a message from it. Each agent defines actions for port binding
(BINDCOMPO), for starting a component (STARTCOMPO), for stopping a compo-
nent (STOPCOMPO), etc. The PS is initialized with a buffer per VM and two
topics for imports/exports (ListBuffers). The RM processes is composed
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in parallel with the rest of system and synchronizes with the other processes
on many actions. For example, the RM defines actions for VM creation and
destruction (INSTANTIATEVMi (i = 1, 2, 3) and DESTROYVM, resp.). The RM
guides also the application reconfiguration by adding and removing compo-
nents from VMs (ADDCP and REMOVECP). When the RM detects a VM failure
(FAILURE), it alerts the PS by an ALERTPS action.
All these actions are used for analyzing the protocol as we will see in the
next subsection.
process MAIN [INSTANTIATEVM1:any, DESTROYVM:any, STARTCOMPO:any,
ADDCP:any, REMOVECP:any, ..] is
par INSTANTIATEVM1, ..., DESTROYVM, ADDCP, REMOVECP,
FAILURE, ALERTPS in
(* the reconfiguration manager *)
RM [INSTANTIATEVM1, ..., DESTROYVM, ADDCP, REMOVECP,
FAILURE, ALERTPS] (appli)
||
par AGENTtoPS1, PStoAGENT3, FAILURE, ... in
par
(* first virtual machine, VM1 *)
Agent[INSTANTIATEVM1, AGENTtoPS1, PStoAGENT1,
DESTROYVM, STARTCOMPO, BINDCOMPO, STOPCOMPO,
UNBINDCOMPO, ADDCP, REMOVECP, FAILURE] (vm1)
||
(* second virtual machine, VM2 *)
Agent[...] (vm2)
||
(* third virtual machine, VM3 *)
Agent[...] (vm3)
end par
||
(* publish-subscribe messaging system *)
PS[AGENTtoPS1, ..., PStoAGENT3, ALERTPS] (?ListBuffers)
end par
end par
end process
3.2. Verification
We apply the LNT specification of the protocol to a set of 600 examples
(application models and reconfiguration scenarios) in order to extensively
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validate our protocol. From the specification and an example, CADP ex-
ploration tools generate an LTS that describes all the possible executions of
the protocol for each example of application model and scenario. Moreover,
we specified 40 properties in MCL [27], the temporal logic used in CADP.
MCL is an extension of alternation-free µ-calculus with regular expressions,
data-based constructs, and fairness operators. These properties helped us to
chase bugs when finding them during the development phase. We use model
checking to verify that they are respected during the protocol execution.
There is an exception that when a VM failure appears, some properties are
not respected (e.g., a started component cannot be connected to a stopped
one). The model checker automatically says whether these properties are
not verified on the LTS. When a bug is detected by model checking tools,
it is identified with a counterexample (a sequence of actions violating the
property). We distinguish two kinds of properties: (i) those allowing to focus
on the protocol behavior for verifying that the final objectives are executed
(Prop. 1 below for instance) and guaranteeing that the architectural invari-
ants for a reconfigurable application are always satisfied (Prop. 2), (ii) and
those helping us to identify more precisely the source of error when one of
the original properties was violated by verifying that the progress/ordering
constraints are respected (Prop. 3, 4, 5, and 6). Following the scenarios
that we want to check, these properties belong to different categories: prop-
erties dedicated to start-up scenarios (Prop. 1 and 2), destruction scenarios
(Prop. 3), mixed scenarios (Prop. 4), and VM failure scenarios (Prop. 5,
and 6). We present in this section some concrete properties verified on the
application model showed in Figure 1:
1. All components are eventually started.
( µX . ( < true > true and [ not "STARTCOMPO !Apache1 !VM1" ] X ) )
and
. . .
and
( µX . ( < true > true and [ not "STARTCOMPO !MySQL !VM3" ] X ) )
This property is automatically generated from the application model,
because it depends on the name of all VMs and components hosted on
each VM.
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2. A component cannot be started before the components on which it
depends for mandatory imports.
[
( "nil" or
true* . "STOPCOMPO !Apache1 !VM1" .
(not "STARTCOMPO !Apache1 !VM1")* ."STOPCOMPO !Tomcat !VM2"
) . (not "STARTCOMPO !Tomcat !VM2")* ."STARTCOMPO !Apache1 !VM1"
] false
In the example of application showed in Figure 1, the Apache1 compo-
nent is connected to the Tomcat component on a mandatory import.
Therefore, we must never find a sequence where Apache1 is started
before Tomcat, or a sequence where Apache1 is stopped, the Tomcat
server is then stopped, and Apache1 is started again before Tomcat.
This property is automatically generated from the application model
because it depends on the component and VM names in the application
model.
3. All components hosted on a VM eventually stop after that VM receives
a destruction request from the DM.
[ true* . { DESTROYVM ?vm:String } ]
inev ( { STOPCOMPO ?cid:String !vm } )
This property uses the macro inev (M), which indicates that a tran-
sition labeled with M eventually occurs. This macro is defined as follows:
macro inev (M) = mu x .( < true > true and [ not M ] X )
end macro
This property does not depend on the application. It can be verified
for any application without knowing the name of VMs and compo-
nents. Parameters can be related in MCL by using variables in action
parameters (e.g., vm for the virtual machine identifier and cid for the
component identifier). This property shows the data-based features
that are available in MCL.
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4. There is no sequence where an import (mandatory or optional) is bound
twice without an unbind in between.
[ true* .
"BINDCOMPO !Apache1 !Workers1" .
( not "UNBINDCOMPO !Apache1 !VM1" )* .
"BINDCOMPO !Apache1 !Workers1"
] false
When a component is connected to another component through an
import (mandatory or optional), it cannot be bound again except if it
is unbound before.
5. There is no sequence with two VM instantiations without a failure or
a destroy in between.
[ true* .
"INSTANTIATEVM1" .
( not "FAILURE !VM1 or DESTROY !VM1" )* .
"INSTANTIATEVM1"
] false
When a VM is instantiated, it cannot be instantiated again except if
this VM is destroyed or failed.
6. A failure action in the VM is eventually followed by an alert of this
failure
[ true* . { FAILURE ?vm:String } ] inev ( { ALERTPS !vm } )
This property does not depend on the application. The variable vm (the
virtual machine identifier) used as first parameter of FAILURE must be
the first parameter in ALERTPS. This property is verified for all appli-
cations and for all VM names and also uses the macro inev.
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3.3. Experiments
We conducted our experiments on more than 600 hand-crafted examples
on a Pentium 4 (2.5GHz, 8GB RAM) running Linux. Each example con-
sists of an application model and a specific scenario (a sequence of instan-
tiate/destroy VM operations and add/remove components to/from VMs).
From this input, the CADP exploration tools generate the corresponding
LTS by enumerating all the possible executions of the system. Finally, the
CADP model checker is called, providing as result a set of diagnostics (true
or false). The model checker returns true if a property is verified. When a
property is not satisfied, it returns false as well as a counterexample. We
present in this section experiments that summarize some of the numbers
obtained when varying the number of VMs, the number of reconfiguration
operations, and the number of failures.
We present in Figure 11 (left) the size of the LTS (transitions) as well
as the time to execute the whole process (LTS generation and properties
checking) when we modify only the number of VMs (no VM destruction
or failure). The number of reconfiguration operations is the same as the
VM number (we only instantiate VMs). Increasing the VM number leads
to an increase of the number of components and ports. Then, the more
VMs and ports, the more parallelism in the system and therefore the more
messages exchanged among VMs. Figure 11 (left) shows how the LTS size
grows exponentially when we slightly increase the number of VMs in the
application. The computation time scales from a few minutes for applications
with 1 VM and few ports to a few hours for an application with 4 or more
VMs.
Figure 11 (right) summarizes the results obtained for the same application
used to obtain results showed in Figure 11 (left) but with a destruction
and re-instantiation operations at the end of the scenario. The LTSs size
and analysis time increase in a remarkable way even when just adding one
destruction operation to the same application. This operation triggers a
double propagation, hence more exchanged messages between the PS and
the agents.
Table 1 shows the size of the LTS (states and transitions) before and
after minimization (wrt. a strong bisimulation relation) as well as the time
to execute the whole process in the last column of the tables (LTS generation
and minimization on the one hand, and properties checking on the other).
These results are obtained for the application described in Figure 1, with an
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increasing number of failures (F). The more VMs fails, the more the LTS size
and analysis time increase.
Fortunately, our goal here was not to analyze huge systems (with poten-
tially many VMs) during the verification of the protocol, but to find bugs in
the protocol. Indeed, most issues were found on small applications describing
pathological reconfiguration cases.
tr
an
si
ti
o
n
s 
n
u
m
b
er
  
10 
     100 
 1000  
       0 
10 000  
   100 000 
   1 000 000 
  10 000 000 
1 
10 
100 
500 
200 
300 
400 
 g
en
er
at
io
n
 +
 v
er
if
ic
at
io
n
  
ti
m
e 
(m
:s
) 
LTS transitions generation + verification 
time 
3 4 5 6 0 
10 
     100 
 1000  
       0 
1 
10 
100 
500 
10 000  
   100 000 
   1 000 000 
  10 000 000 
2 1 
200 
300 
400 
 g
en
er
at
io
n
 +
 v
er
if
ic
at
io
n
  
ti
m
e 
(m
:s
) 
600 600  100 000 000  100 000 000 
3 4 5 6 0 2 1 
tr
an
si
ti
o
n
s 
n
u
m
b
er
  
VMs number  VMs number  
Figure 11: Experimental results when increasing the number of VMs (left) start-up sce-
nario without failure, (right) start-up and destruction scenario without failure
3.4. Problems Found
We have presented in this section the specification and verification of our
protocol. Model checking tools permitted to find bugs that were identified
by counterexample analysis. This allowed us to revise several parts and
correct specific issues (e.g., adding some acknowledgement messages after
binding/unbinding ports, starting/stopping components, etc.) in both the
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F LTS (states/transitions) Time (m:s)
raw minimized LTS gen. / Verif.
0 452,378/983,963 8,531/29,394 9:21 / 1:84
1 612,293/1,262,732 9,568/31,472 10:37 / 1:79
2 682,459/1,420,543 12,390/38,971 16:59 / 2:83
3 793,813/1,584,238 16,673/48,562 24:73 / 3:69
4 993,527/1,763,227 19,586/63,254 31:91 / 4:56
Table 1: Experimental results (with failures)
specification and implementation that were written at the same time. During
the verification steps, we detected two important issues that we corrected in
the latest version of the protocol. The implementation was systematically
corrected. In the rest of this section we will focus on these two problems.
In the first version of the protocol, the RM was centralized and in charge
of creating VMs, starting and stopping components. Therefore it kept track
of the states of components for each VM. To do this, the RM was informed ev-
ery time there was a change in the application. It communicated with all the
agents by exchanging messages in order to update the application after each
change in the component architecture (e.g., a component binds to another
component, a component changes its state). There was an overhead of mes-
sages transmitted to and from the RM. We noticed during our experiments
that even with simple applications, CADP generated huge LTSs. We solved
this drawback by proposing a decentralized version of the protocol. The new
version of the protocol consists of an RM that is not in charge of starting or
stopping components. The RM guides only the application reconfiguration
by instantiating, destroying, and repairing VMs, or by adding and removing
components from an existing VM. It is part of the agent behavior to drive
the component start-up/shutdown. The decentralized version of the protocol
avoids additional, unnecessary messages exchanged between agents and the
RM. This version guarantees more parallelism and better performance in the
corresponding implementation of the protocol.
The second issue that we detected during the verification of the protocol
is in the way VMs are destroyed. Originally, when a component required
to stop, it was stopped and then all components bound to it were stopped.
Stopping components in this order induced started components connected to
stopped components. This violated the consistency of the component com-
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position and well-formedness architectural invariants. This bug was detected
thanks to a property stating that “ a component cannot be started and con-
nected through an import (mandatory or optional) to a stopped component ”.
Thus, we corrected this bug by proposing another way to stop components.
When a component needs to stop, it requests to all components bound to it
to unbind and once it is done, it can immediately stop. This implies first
a backward propagation along components bound on mandatory imports.
Once this first propagation stops (a component does not provide service or
is connected only through optional imports), we start a forward propagation
during which components are actually stopped and indicate to their part-
ners that they have just stopped and unbound. This double propagation, as
presented in Section 2.3, is necessary for preserving the component architec-
ture consistency and for avoiding that started components can keep on using
stopped components.
3.5. Discussion
In the final part of this section, we would like to comment on alternative
verification techniques we could have used to complement our model checking
based approach.
In order to formally analyse the reconfiguration protocol, we specified
over 600 application models and reconfiguration scenarios in order to ex-
tensively validate our protocol. When achieving these tasks, we paid a lot
of attention to cover very different applications and scenarios, in particular
pathological and corner cases. Hence, this large investment in validation was
helpful in order to detect very early in the development process subtle bugs
and issues (see subsection 3.4 for more details). This also makes us highly
confident in the correctness of the protocol. However, a limit of our model
checking based analysis is that it works on concrete configurations and sce-
narios. A way to generalise these verification results would be to reason on
generic applications and scenarios using for instance parameterised systems
verification techniques [33]. The application of these techniques to our work
is not straightforward and several difficulties have to be faced and solved. As
an example, when we change a reconfiguration scenario by, e.g., removing
a reconfiguration operation or by changing the order of the reconfiguration
operations, there is no formal relation connecting the LTS generated for the
former scenario and the new LTS. Moreover, given an application model, we
can infer an infinite number of possible reconfiguration scenarios. Nonethe-
less, this is a perspective of interest and we plan to study this idea in more
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details in future work.
Another complementary approach is to prove the correctness of the pro-
tocol using theorem proving techniques as achieved with Coq in [7] for en-
suring the correctness of the reconfiguration of component assemblies. This
is a very interesting and ambitious objective, but this would complement the
validation of the reconfiguration protocol using model checking techniques
presented in this paper, by ensuring that the protocol would work for any
application and any reconfiguration scenario.
4. Related Work
In [13, 19], the authors propose languages and configuration protocols for
distributed applications in the cloud. [13] adopts a model driven approach
with extensions of the Essential Meta-Object Facility (EMOF) abstract syn-
tax to describe a distributed application, its requirements towards the under-
lying execution platforms, and its architectural constraints (e.g., concerning
placement and collocation). Contrary to us, in [13], the deployment does not
work in a decentralized fashion, and this harms the scalability of applications
that can be deployed.
A recent related work [17] presents a system that manages application
stack configuration. It provides techniques to configure services across ma-
chines according to their dependencies, to deploy components, and to manage
the life cycle of installed resources. This work presents some similarities with
ours, but [17] does not explain how they preserve composition consistency
and architectural invariants when stopping resource drivers. The authors
write that going from an active state to an inactive state has as precondition
that dependencies are inactive without explaining the mechanism used to
deactivate them.
There exist many approaches which focus on specifying and verifying dis-
tributed systems and component-based systems. In [22, 25, 26, 5, 32, 10, 29,
23], the authors proposed various formal models (Darwin, Wright, etc.) in
order to specify dynamic reconfiguration of component-based systems whose
architectures can evolve (addition/removal of components and connections)
at run-time. These techniques are adequate for formally designing dynamic
applications. In [22, 26] for instance, the authors show how to formally ana-
lyze behavioral models of components using the Labeled Transition System
Analyzer. Our focus is quite different here, because we work on a protocol
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whose goal is to automatically achieve these reconfiguration tasks, and to
assure that this protocol respects some key properties during its application.
In [14, 15, 31], the authors describe a protocol that automates the con-
figuration of distributed applications in cloud environments. In these appli-
cations, all elements are known from the beginning (e.g., numbers of VMs
and components, bindings among components, etc.). Moreover, this proto-
col allows one to automate the application deployment, but not to modify
the application at run-time. Another related work is [8], where the authors
propose a robust reconfiguration protocol for an architectural assembly of
software components. This work does not consider the distribution of com-
ponents across several VMs, but assumes that they are located on a same
VM. In [16], the authors present a self-deployment protocol able to auto-
matically deploy cloud applications in a decentralized fashion. This protocol
supports VM failures by detecting and repairing them, but it does not sup-
port reconfiguration features.
In [24], the authors present a design and an implementation of a technique
for the automatic synthesis of deployment plans. It provides a reconfigura-
tion algorithm to deploy heterogeneous software components and compute
the sequence of actions allowing the deployment of a desired configuration.
The algorithm works even in the presence of circular dependencies among
components. This work presents some similarities with ours, but [24] does
not provide methods for verifying its techniques and algorithms.
In [11], the authors present the Aeolus component model that aims at
mastering the complexity of cloud applications. It automates as much as pos-
sible the management of such applications. It uses an initial configuration,
an universe of available components and a target component. A component
is a grey-box presenting internal states and mechanisms to change its state
during the deployment and reconfiguration process. In [11] the initial con-
figuration, target components and actions are known from the beginning but
the algorithm/protocol does not support modifications that can take place
at run-time.
This article is an extended version of a conference paper published in [4].
The key additions of this journal version are as follows: (i) introduction of
new reconfiguration actions (addition and removal of components), (ii) exten-
sion of the protocol in order to detect and repair VM failures, (iii) a detailed
presentation of the properties to verify the protocol, especially properties
which verify the failure detection and repair, (iv) more experiments espe-
cially with multiple VM failures, and (v) presentation of an updated review
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of related work.
5. Concluding Remarks
In this article, we have presented a protocol that aims to dynamically re-
configure distributed cloud applications and support VM failures. It enables
one to instantiate new VMs/destroy existing VMs and to add new compo-
nents/remove existing components. Upon reception of these reconfiguration
operations, VM agents connect/disconnect and start/stop components in a
defined order for preserving the application consistency, which is quite com-
plicated due to the high parallelism degree of the protocol. This protocol
does not only detect VM failures but also repairs failures by creating a new
instance for each failed VM and by warning the other VMs of this failure.
The protocol is robust and fault-tolerant. It succeeds in stopping/starting
components hosted on the different virtual machines even in case of mul-
tiple failures. The protocol was formally specified and verified using the
LNT specification language and the CADP toolbox, which turned out to
be very convenient for modeling and analyzing such protocols, see [30] for
a discussion about this subject. Model checking techniques were used to
verify about 40 properties of interest on a large number of application mod-
els and reconfiguration scenarios. More importantly, during this verification
stage, we improved several parts of the protocol and found several bugs. In
particular, we deeply revise the part of the protocol dedicated to the VM
destruction and component shutdown. All these issues have been corrected
in the corresponding Java implementation.
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